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North-North-South Ag-Biotech Policy:  
Implications for Growth and Trade
The last five years have seen a dramatic rise in the commercialization of
agricultural biotech products.  Since the introduction of transgenic corn, cotton and
soybeans in 1996, the global area planted to commercial transgenic crops increased to
27.8 million hectares in 1998 - one of the highest adoption rates for new technologies by
agricultural industry standards (James, 1998).  However, the production of transgenic
crops and other ag-biotech products,  is not yet a truly global phenomenon as it is highly
concentrated among a few countries.  In this paper we examine the impact of European
Union (EU) policy on genetically modified organisms on trade flows and agricultural
economic growth.  We find that restrictive EU policy on biotech production and
consumption may result in: an effective export subsidy of capital to the South; new trade
flows; North America being the dominant producer of biotech R&D; the South being a
dominant producer of biotech products; and the European Union will be the dominant
producer of traditional agricultural products.  
In 1998, the United States accounted for 75% of all transgenic crops grown, with
Argentina and Canada accounting for another 23%  (James, 1998).  Three primary factors
explain the biotech dominance of the United States.  First, the United States has
historically had a leadership role in most high technology areas, including biotech.  In
1996, for example, there were 1,287 biotech firms in the United States employing 118,000
workers compared to 716 firms and 27,500 workers in all of Europe (Ernst and Young,
1997).  US firms earned US$14.6 billion in revenues and spent US$7.9 billion in research3
and development (R&D), whereas European firms earned only US$1.4 billion and spent
only US$1.2 on R&D.  Second, weak technological capability, inadequate protection of
intellectual property rights (IPRs), and lack of biosafety standards in developing countries
have deterred private companies from investing in or selling biotechnologies in developing
countries.  With time, this is likely to change since many developing countries are building
a technological base, strengthening their intellectual property right systems, and putting
into place biosafety protocols for approving biotech products.  Whether biotech products
gain widespread acceptance in developing countries is still uncertain, and is as likely to be
decided by political factors as scientific or economic merit.  Third, in contrast to US and
Canadian consumers, European consumer concerns over possible negative health and
environmental impacts of biotech products have been very strong, resulting in restrictive
governmental policies on production and consumption.  Consumer backlash has also led
many food processors and retailers in Europe to decide against selling or importing
biotech products.
European Union restrictive biotech policies have led to considerable disruption in
trade flows of biotech products.  For example, US corn exports to the European Union
dropped by 96% from the 1996-97 season to the 1997-98, as a consequence of European
Union rejection of shipments containing any amount of grain produced from transgenic
seed.  Consequently, 
“Archer Daniels Midland Co., for example, says it will pay extra for a certain type
of soybean created through traditional breeding [and] A.E. Staley Manufacturing
Co. won't take bioengineered corn that hasn't been endorsed by the European
Union. ...The EU usually represents 5 percent of American corn exports; now it
accounts for less than 1 percent,” (St. Louis Post-Dispatch).4
In light of  the impact these policies are having on world trade in the coming years,
it is important that this issue be analyzed in a comprehensive manner.  In endeavoring to
do so in this paper, we analyze the static and dynamic effects of policies concerning the
production and consumption of genetically modified agricultural products utilizing the
dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (H-O-S) trade model presented in Dinopoulos,
Oehmke and Segerstrom.  In the next section we present the basic model framework  and
investigate trade effects of biotech production and consumption policies.  In the following
section on biotech R&D and growth, we extend the model to investigate the dynamic
effects of biotech research and development on economic growth and trade flows.  We
conclude with a discussion of the implications for economic growth, welfare and the trade
patterns for the European Union, North America and the South, under restrictive EU
biotech policies.
The Model
In this model we consider three trading blocs differentiated by their relative R&D
capabilities, capital-labor ratios, and regulatory policies relevant to biotech production and
consumption.  Two of the trading blocs are in the North - North America (NAm) and the
European Union (EU) - and one in the South (S).  Each block is characterized by three
sectors: an outside good sector, a biotech sector, and the R&D sector.  The outside good
sector includes traditional (non-biotech) agricultural products that we assume do not
experience innovation.  The biotech sector is represented by those goods that can be
replaced by new goods of higher quality through innovation resulting from research and
development.  The R&D sector, therefore, affects innovation in the biotech sector.  We5
utilize a unique neo-Schumpeterian approach to investigate biotech R&D and innovation. 
The underlying assumptions of this approach are that: 
• R&D is inherently a risky investment,
• biotech products are made obsolete and replaced by the next generation of higher
quality products,
• successful researchers obtain some degree of monopoly power and rents from their
discovery of the next generation of products, and 
• the lure of monopoly profits draws firms into the R&D process.  
Each assumption broadly represents a part of the biotech industry.  (See Dinopoulos for
further details about this neo-Schumpeterian approach).   
Models utilizing this approach have a rich history of application in the economics
literature.  Endogenous growth resulting from research and development was shown by
Grossman and Helpman to be an important element in modern economic growth. 
Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos have applied the North-South model to economic
growth and found that sequential innovation races resulted in economic growth.  In this
paper we combine and extend the North-South model from Segerstrom, Anant, and
Dinopolous and the North-North model from Dinopoulos, Oehmke, and Segerstrom to
examine the evolution of trade patterns, innovation, and competitive advantage in biotech
products.
The assumptions concerning initial endowments for each trading block are as




research and development expenditures are R&D
NAm > R&D
EU > R&D
S, and the gross6
domestic incomes (GDP) are GDP
NAm > GDP
EU > GDP
S.  Intellectual property rights
(IPRs) and protection are assumed equivalent in North America and European Union but
lower in the South.  The world consists of two types of governmental policies, those that
allow the production and consumption of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and
those that do not.  The European Union allows neither production nor consumption of
biotech products while the North America and South have no restriction on production.
1  
Finally, we assume that the South is unable to produce biotech R&D (although North
America and EU firms may conduct R&D in the South using North America and EU
production factors).
Production Restrictions
The Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson diagram in figure 1 illustrates the initial model
assumptions.  The bottom left corner is the origin for the European Union while the North
America and South make up the balance of the world with their origin at the top right. 
The European Union is separated to highlight their restrictive biotech policies while North
America and South are combined and make up the balance of the world.  The endowment
(E) points reflect the capital-labor endowments of the countries.  The polygon in the
interior of the box represents the factor-price equalization set.  For endowments lying
within this box, trade in final products result in factor price equalization across countries. 
Each line segment represents the equilibrium world allocation of capital and labor to
produce R&D, biotech goods, which are themselves the result of R&D, or outside goods. 
For example, the vector from EU to Aw represents the world allocation of factors for the
production of R&D.  The relative slopes of the production vectors reveal that R&D is the7
most capital intensive while outside goods are the most labor intensive.
Each vector with an arrow in figure 1 represents the allocation of a trading block’s
capital and labor utilized in the production of a specific product.  The moratorium on
biotech production means that the European Union produces only R&D (graphically
represented by the vector from the EU origin to A) and outside goods (vector from A to
B).  The North America and South trading blocks produce all biotech goods (NAm & S
origin to G) as well as the balance of R&D (G to D) and outside goods (D to B).  Note
that the European Union still engages in R&D, which results in biotech products, even
though they are not allowed to produce biotech products.  
Figure 2 differentiates North America and the South production activities.  The
North America origin is at the endowment point for the European Union (B in figure 1). 
The endowment point for North America and the South is E
NAm&S.  The sectoral factor
allocations are represented by dotted vectors in figure 2.  Assuming that the South initially
conducting no R&D due to its capital intensity, the mapping of the outside goods and
biotech sector determines the production levels.  Therefore, North America produces all
of the R&D products when considering only the North America and the South only
(represented by the vector from NAm origin to H).  Both North America and the South
produce outside goods (vector from I to J for North America and vector from M to the
northeast origin for the South) and biotech products (vector from H to I for the North
America and vector from J to M for the South).  With the restriction of no biotech goods
produced by the European Union, the result is that the South is a major producer of
biotech outputs (vector from M to J).   The South may become the dominant producer of8
biotech products by devoting the greatest amount of its resources to this type of
production (} MJ } > } HI }).  This is more likely to result if North America’s capital/labor
ratio becomes sufficiently high so that it specializes in R&D rather than producing both
R&D and biotech.
The fact that the South is an early adopter and producer of new innovations is not
a standard result from the typical N-S or N-N-S trade models.  The product life cycle in a
N-S or N-N-S trade model is typically that an innovation is developed and produced in
North America, production begins in the European Union and, once that market is
saturated, the South produces the good (Vernon; Gandolfo).  In the traditional model,
North America enjoys the monopoly rents, the European Union faces monopolistic
competition and the South faces pure competition in the market.  This new result, given
the technology policy restriction by the European Union, transfers the monopolistically
competitive market from the European Union to the South.  With aggressive intellectual
property rights laws, the South may even be the first producer of certain biotech products
from R&D races.
Effects of Consumption Restrictions
To this point we have focused on production decisions.  Consider the consumption
decisions and the resulting trade effects.  Assuming homothetic preferences, the European
Union and the NAm&S consumption points, C
EU and C
NAm&S, lie on the diagonal (figure
3).  Trading takes place along the factor price ratio line (-wl/wk) which is determined by
world equilibrium.  The factor content of trade is represented by a vector from the
endowment point to the consumption point.  (Note that the EU endowment point is the9
same point as the origin for North America.)  The result is that the European Union
consumes more labor intensive outside goods than it produces, therefore the European
Union will import the balance of its outside goods from NAm&S (vector from E
EU to
C
EU).  North America, like the European Union, will import labor intensive outside goods





NAm&S,  represents the factor content of trade between North America
and South only.  The South’s trade mix is the opposite.  These short-run results are
standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson outcomes.
When the biotech consumption restrictions are enforced, the results become more
interesting.  Figure 4 illustrates heuristically what happens to EU trade when the policy
restriction on biotech products are enforced.  The contract curve, a locus of points
representing the optimal allocation of production factors, lies below the diagonal because
EU consumers will not consume biotech goods.  Instead, EU consumers prefer outside
goods which are labor intensive goods.  The trade vector from the EU endowment to the
diagonal reflects the trade under homothetic preferences as discussed in figure 3.  When
the restrictive policy is implemented, the consumption point is on the new contract curve,
which means that the European Union imports more labor-intensive goods in the short run
than they would have without consumption restrictions.
Biotech R&D and Growth
World production and consumption are not constant over time.  Indeed, one of the
primary effects of R&D is to expand production, and thus consumption, through
productivity increases.  To represent growth in a Hecksher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework,10
we follow Dinopoulos, Oehmke and Segerstrom and interpret production factors as
measured in efficiency units.   An increase in factor productivity is assumed to be
equivalent to an increase in the efficiency of the factors employed in production (as is the
case in any constant returns to scale production function).  In this context, the Hecksher-
Ohlin-Samuelson framework allows exploration of the efficiency-adjusted factor content
of international trade.  
R&D increases factor productivity, and thus increases the effective amount of
factors available to the world economy.  Following Dinopoulos, Oehmke and Segerstrom,
we assume that technologies are owned by the inventor until the next-generation
innovation is discovered.  Upon this discovery, the previous-generation innovation
becomes public knowledge–that is, the firm owning the previous-generation ceases to
spend money protecting its now obsolete invention (this is also consistent with Bertrand
competition between the owners of the previous and current generations of technology).  
The initial R&D race to discover the first biotech innovation increases the world’s
efficiency-adjusted factor endowment (figure 5).  Following Dinopoulos, Oehmke and
Segerstrom, this increase is in proportion to the capital/labor ratio employed in the R&D
sector, which created the first biotech innovation.  The world increase in efficiency-
adjusted factors is represented by the movement of the second origin from NAm&S to
NAm&S’ in figure 5.  (The points E
NAm and E
S have been re-scaled so that the vector from
NAm&S’ to E
NAm and NAm&S’ to E
S in figure 5 are equivalent to NAm&S to E
NAm and
NAm&S to E
S, in figure 3.)   The discovering firm owns the first biotech innovation, and
consequently the increase in efficiency-adjusted factors.  This firm is located in North11
America with probability R&D
NAm/R&D and in the European Union with probability
R&D
EU/R&D.  The expected increase in efficiency-adjusted factors for North America and
European Union are the world increase in efficiency-adjusted factors multiplied by the
probability that the firm is located in North America or the European Union.  The
expected increase in the North America efficiency-adjusted factor endowment is
represented by the vector from E
NAm to E
NAm’.  The expected increase in the EU
efficiency-adjusted factor endowment is represented by the vector from E
EU to E
EU’.   The
South, owning none of the R&D firms, receives no increase in efficiency-adjusted factors
after the initial R&D discovery.
The effects of the discovery of later innovations are somewhat more complicated. 
Upon the discovery of innovation 2, the discovering firm gains monopoly rents, and the
owners of innovation 1 lose their monopoly rents.  The net effect will depend on the
relative magnitude of the rents.  Motivated by findings of the existence and properties of
the steady-state equilibrium in Dinopoulos, Oehmke and Segerstrom, we assume the
existence of a steady-state in which R&D expenditures and monopoly rents are constant
for each R&D race.  In this case, the net effect of the discovery of innovation 2 on
industry monopoly rents is nill.  That is, the asset increases described in figure 5 are ‘a one
time shift only.’
However, upon discovery of innovation 2, the initial innovation becomes publicly
accessible.  That is, the economic value of the increased efficiency from innovation
1(compared to the no innovation scenario) is now captured by producers rather than by a
monopolist supplier of the biotechnology.  With a competitive production sector this value12
is passed on to consumers in the form of increased production.
Using efficiency-adjusted factor endowments, the effects of innovation 1 becoming
publicly accessible are depicted in figure 6.   The increased efficiency of biotechnology
production is represented by the shift in the second origin from NAm&S’ to NAm&S”. 
This vector is drawn with the same capital/labor ratio employed in biotechnology
production.  The length from NAm&S’ to NAm&S” is determined by the increase in
efficiency attributable to the innovation.  The vector from NAm&S to NAm&S”
represents the increase in factors employed with initial technology that would be necessary
to produce output equal to the amount produced using factors represented by the vector
from NAm&S to G at the new technology level.  Assume the effect of the innovation is to
increase productivity by (￿-1).  The same level of production can be achieved by
increasing the quantity of capital and labor by (￿-1) with no increase in productivity
(under constant returns to scale).  Consequently, we represent the effect of the
productivity increase as an increase in the effective factor endowments.  A similar
efficiency adjustment is made after each successive innovation becomes publicly
accessible, leading to a series of expansions from NAm&S’ to NAm&S”.
The increased effective factor endowments are obtained by the producers of the




EU”. The level of the endowment changes are (￿￿1)HI
for North America, where NAm&S” to E
NAm” (in figure 6) equals  NAm&S’ to
E
NAm’+(￿￿1)HI (from figure 2),  and (￿￿1)JM for the South, where NAm&S” to E
S’ (in
figure 6) equals  NAm&S’ to E
S’+(￿￿1)JM (from figure 2).13
Since the European Union produces no biotech, there is no increase in the effective
factors of production employed in the European Union.  Thus E
EU’ = E
EU”.  Similar
increases in the effective endowments for North America and the South occur as each
successive generation of biotechnology becomes publicly accessible.  The effective EU
endowment remains unchanged.
Because biotechnology production is more capital intensive than is the initial world
endowment the world becomes more abundantly endowed in effective capital relative to
effective labor.  Since the South is initially relatively labor abundant, it too becomes more
abundant in effective capital.  The effect on North America is less clear.  If the initial
endowment E
NAm is more capital abundant than is the use of capital in biotech production,
then increases in effective endowments along the capital/labor ratio determined by biotech
production will make North America relatively less capital intensive. The European Union
itself is not affected by increases in effective endowment, after the initial R&D-driven
increase.  Thus, as the world becomes more capital abundant, the European Union
becomes relatively less capital abundant and more labor abundant.  
In terms of economic growth, capital expansion as modeled here largely benefits
the South.  Over time it is conceivable that the South will become capital-intensive and be
a player in the biotech R&D race.  As the successful biotech research augments the
effective capital and labor devoted to biotech production, we expect the South’s economy
to expand at the expense of the European economy.  This is a direct result of the
restrictive biotech policies.  As the European Union becomes more labor intensive and
consumes more labor intensive goods, the amount of trade with the rest of the world is14
expected to decrease, hence, the European Union will lower its agricultural related GDP. 
It is unclear whether trade from North America and the South will increase or decrease. 
North America and the South are expected to continue producing all three goods.  
Conclusions
The major results of this paper may be summarized as follows: under the restrictive
EU policies on biotech production and consumption North America will be the dominant
producer of R&D; the South may be the dominant producer of biotech products; and the
European Union will be the dominant producer of outside goods (traditional agricultural
products).  These results are interesting because they imply that over time the European
Union will produce products that are more labor intensive and the South will produce
goods that are more capital intensive.  The South might experience positive spillover
effects from the biotech production process and evolve into a R&D competitor in the long
run.  
In this analysis the trade flows are different from the usual North-South trade
models.  Given the restriction on consumption and production of biotech products in the
European Union, the product life cycle for biotech R&D in our model goes from North
America directly to the South versus in the North-South trade models where it would have
gone from North America to the European Union and then to the South.  The South is
expected to become the dominant producer of biotech outputs.   It is conceivable that the
South will not only produce the raw biotech products in the long run but will also add
value to those products for export to the rest of the world (i.e., Europe may import
refined products such as cotton shirts that originate from Bt cotton grown in the South). 15
These results indicate positive potential economic growth in the South.  Second, the
European Union will produce more labor intensive outputs which are the outside good
products.  Due to their high production and consumption of labor intensive goods,
agriculturally related trade from the European Union is expected to decrease.  The EU
firms will conduct their R&D somewhere, hence, they will choose to invest in North
America or the South depending on the intellectual property rights, biosafety regulations,
and the risk of producing that particular product.
The overall effect of the restrictive EU biotech policies is an effective export
subsidy of capital to the South.  The South will become more capital intensive with
respect to both production and consumption, increase the value of  its traded goods,
benefit from the spillover effects, and become a player in the R&D market. 16
Endnotes
1 The authors recognize that there are countries in the South that will not allow the
production or consumption of biotech products in their respective nations, however, on
average, the South will be a major player in the biotech industry.
2 This is a departure from Dinopoulos, Oehmke and Segerstrom, who model quality
improvement in the high-technology product.  In their model, consumers benefit directly
from the higher quality once the innovation becomes public knowledge.17
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Figure 1.  Factor Content of production with no EU Biotech Production20





Figure 3.  Factor Content of International Trade22
Figure 4.  Factor Content of Consumption and Trade with EU Biotech Consumption Restriction.
 23
Figure 5.  Asset Expansion and Expected Asset-Adjusted Endowments24
Figure 6.  Effective Factor Content of Production, Consumption and Trade